Social primes (pro-social, anti-social) can modulate mimicry behaviour. To date, these social modulation effects have been explained by the primed incentive to affiliate with another (Social Top-Down Response Modulation; STORM) and the primed active-selfconcept leading to behaviour that is either consistent or inconsistent with the prime-construct (Active-Self account). The present study was designed to explore the explanatory power for each of these accounts, and thereby gain a greater understanding of how social modulation unfolds. To do this, we assessed social modulation of motor contagion in individuals high or low in self-monitoring. It was reasoned that high self-monitors would modulate mimicry according to the primed social incentive, whereas low self-monitors would modulate according to the primed active-self-concept. Participants were primed with a pro-social and anti-social cue in the first-person and third-person perspective. Next, they completed an interpersonal observation-execution task featuring the simultaneous observation and execution of arm movements that were either congruent or incongruent to each other. Results showed increased incongruent movement deviation (motor contagion) for the anti-social compared to the pro-social prime in the high self-monitors only. Findings support the STORM account of mimicry by showing observers modulate behaviour based on the social incentive underpinning an interpersonal exchange.
Introduction
Observing an action can influence the physical execution of that same action (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz,, 2000; Castiello, 2003; Dijkerman & Smit, 2007; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Mattar & Gribble, 2005; Welsh et al., 2005) . For example, when primed to execute a finger/grasp response via a numeric cue (Brass et al., 2000; Liepelt, von Cramon, & Brass, 2008) or change in stimulus configuration (Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010; Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005; , participants respond faster when an observed action is congruent, as opposed to incongruent, with their own response action. The differences in response times have been associated with lower-level sensorimotor processes that underlie imitation and mimicry. The notion is that an observer maps an observed action onto a corresponding sensorimotor response code (i.e., visuomotor priming), which facilitates the execution of the same action, or interferes with the execution of an alternative action (Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1997; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010) .
Mimicry behaviour associated with the difference between observed congruent and incongruent action stimuli can be modulated by priming observers with pro-or anti-social attitudes (Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010) . Using a scrambled sentence task, Leighton et al. (2010) showed pro-social primes (e.g., 'She is my friend') increased mimicry compared to anti-social primes (e.g., 'They are our enemy'). In addition, the involuntary mimicry of actions during a naturalistic interpersonal exchange increased following a pro-social compared to an anti-social prime (van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, de Bouter, & van Knippenberg, 2003) . The influence of social processes on the coupling between perception and action during mimicry may be explained by the Social Top-down Response Modulation (STORM) account (Wang & Hamilton, 2012) , which suggests that observers activate a strategic incentive to facilitate social interactions with other agents, thus leading to positive social affect. More specifically, a social prime may activate a goal to affiliate with another individual, such that the observer involuntarily adopts mimicry in order to achieve this social goal. In this instance, mimicry is adopted because observers enhance their chances of being liked or favoured by the individual being mimicked (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) .
Because the STORM account suggests that mimicry is contingent upon an observer's goal to affiliate, mimicry behaviour is modulated according to the context in which an interpersonal exchange unfolds. For example, the initial failure to affiliate with another individual (Lakin Chartrand, 2003) , or when becoming excluded from group-based tasks (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Over & Carpenter, 2009) , can increase involuntary mimicry. Moreover, when presented with an anti-social compared to a pro-social prime, observers produced increased mimicry effects when interacting with a human model stimulus (Roberts, Bennett, & Hayes, 2016) . In these anti-social instances, it was suggested that prior to an interpersonal exchange, an observer may have already established a specific goal to affiliate with another individual (see Miles, Nind, Henderson, & Macrae, 2010) . Thus, in the event there is a perceived threat to obtaining this goal during the interpersonal exchange (e.g., anti-social context), an observer may enhance mimicry in order to accommodate for such a loss. In this regard, mimicry is adopted in an attempt to achieve positive social affect within the individual being mimicked, although when initially threatened the mimicry may be more accurately described as a process of restoring social harmony.
Using a similar stimulus-response procedure as Leighton et al. (2010) , Wang and Hamilton (2013) concluded in favour of an alternative Active-Self account to explain the social modulation of behavioural mimicry. Mimicry was found to increase following prosocial primes compared to anti-social primes when self-related pronouns were also presented (e.g., 'I', 'we'), whereas mimicry was greater following anti-social primes compared to pro-social primes (Experiment 2) when third-person nouns were presented (e.g., 'Joe', 'Greg').
These findings were suggested to manifest from a role of the active-self-concept, which refers to a transient and readily accessible form of the 'self', and is a subset of the chronic selfconcept, which refers to an invariant and long-term representation of the 'self' (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007) . The influence of primes on behaviour can be determined by whether the prime-construct assimilates or contrasts with the active-self-concept. That is, while primes make certain social information accessible, it is how the information is processed by an observer in relation to the 'self' that modulates the direction of mimicry.
With regards to the findings of Wang and Hamilton (2013) , the impact of social primes on mimicry was contingent upon whether the primes assimilated with the pro-social self-concept during first-person presentation, or contrasted during the third-person presentation. To elucidate, the pro-social prime from the first-person perspective may have assimilated with the pro-social self-concept, which then elicited mimicry behaviour consistent with the primed-construct (pro-social). When the pro-social prime was taken from the third-person perspective, it did not contrast with the pro-social self-concept, and thus generated less mimicry. For the anti-social prime that was taken from the first-person perspective, there was no assimilation with the pro-social self-concept, which limited mimicry. However, when the anti-social prime was taken from the third-person perspective, it likely contrasted with the pro-social self-concept, which then generated prosocial mimicry as a form of behaviour that was inconsistent with primed-construct (anti-social).
Because of the proposed role of the active-self-concept, it is reasonable to consider whether the social modulation of mimicry is influenced by individual differences in perceiving and implementing self-related information. Indeed, a characteristic feature of the 'self' is self-monitoring, which refers to a process of monitoring and adapting one's behaviour in accordance with the situational context (Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 5 1986 ). High self-monitors demonstrate increased sensitivity to situational cues and are more adept at changing their own behaviour to fit into social environments (i.e., persons of impression).
1 Low-self-monitors demonstrate increased sensitivity to dispositional cues such that behaviour is more consistent with their own feelings and beliefs (i.e., persons of expression).
To date, evidence suggests there is a greater tendency to mimic one's peers (e.g., fellow undergraduate student) compared to non-peers (e.g., high school student) in high selfmonitors, but not in low self-monitors (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003) . Moreover, there is a positive relationship between self-monitoring scores (higher scores indicating high selfmonitoring) and the mimicry of facial expressions that generate positive social affect (i.e., laughing), but not for expressions generating negative social affect (i.e., frowning) (Estow, Jamieson, & Yates, 2007) . Consistent with the STORM account, these findings suggest that high self-monitors more readily interpret social primes as situational cues, which leads to greater social modulation compared to low self-monitors. Therefore, social modulation of mimicry behaviour can unfold because an observer seeks to create an impression.
Alternatively, when priming individuals to a number '7' (priming feeling of lucky), compared to number '13' (priming feeling of unlucky), there is a greater tendency to interpret non-word masks as lucky-related words in low self-monitors, but not in high self-monitors (Experiment 2; DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty, 2005) . This finding suggests that low selfmonitors more closely reflect their own feelings, and the associated primed-construct, compared to high self-monitors (Wheeler et al., 2007) . Thus, based on the Active-Self account, it could be that low self-monitors perceive social primes as dispositional cues, which leads to increased social modulation compared to high self-monitors. In this regard, the social modulation of mimicry behaviour unfolds as a form of expression.
6
To date, both the STORM and Active-Self accounts have contributed to our understanding social modulation of mimicry behaviour. Thus, the aim of the present study is to further examine these theoretical accounts by exploring the influence of self-monitoring, which predicts different outcomes for each of these respective accounts. In our previous work on social modulation (Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016) , observers executed horizontal arm movements while concurrently observing a congruent horizontal, or an incongruent curvilinear, human arm movement. Social context was primed using pro-social or anti-social words. Similar to the results of Wang and Hamilton (2013), we showed greater motor contagion (as indicated by greater orthogonal movement deviation for incongruent compared to congruent stimuli), and therefore mimicry, following anti-social compared to pro-social primes (N.B., without manipulating person-perspective). To extend this work, we used a similar interpersonal protocol to examine mimicry in high and low self-monitors (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986 ) when primed with anti-social and pro-social primes from a first or thirdperson perspective. Figure 1 illustrates the hypotheses and predicted behavioural outcomes associated with STORM and Active-Self accounts of social modulation. Firstly, it is predicted that there will be greater deviation away from the intended direction of movement and toward the orthogonal axis during the observation of incongruent compared to congruent movement stimuli (i.e., motor contagion or mimicry effect), irrespective of social information (see Kilner et al., 2003; Roberts, Hayes, Uji, & Bennett, 2015) . In accord with the STORM account, we predict there to be increase in motor contagion following an anti-social compared to pro-social prime (i.e., social modulation effect) (Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016) , which will be greater in high self-monitors compared to low self-monitors. Because the STORM account does not specify how self-related information influences social modulation, it could be expected that there will be no significant change in the social modulation effects (pro-social 7 vs. anti-social) when first-or third-person perspective primes are presented. Alternatively, based on the Active-Self account, we predict that there will be increased motor contagion following a pro-social compared to an anti-social prime in the first-person perspective (Wang & Hamilton, 2013) , and increased contagion following an anti-social compared to the prosocial prime in the third-person perspective, with these effects being greater in low selfmonitors compared to high self-monitors.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Method

Participants
Data was recorded from thirty-eight participants (age range of 18-21 years), although one participant was removed due to recording errors (high self-monitoring n=19, low selfmonitoring n=18). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written informed consent prior to participation. The experiment was designed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the local ethics committee of the host university.
Apparatus and Materials
The stimulus display was back-projected (Hitachi CP-X345) on a flat white screen (2.74 x 3.66 m) at a viewing distance of 1.9 m. Pre-recorded video-clips were edited using Adobe Premier CS5 software, and later presented using the COGENT toolbox implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc). Movements were recorded at 200Hz from an infrared sensor positioned on the tip of the right index finger using a 3D Investigator Motion Capture system (Northern Digital Inc., Ontario, Canada). The first and last 5 s of data recordings were discarded to minimize asynchrony around movement onset, and the potential influence of attentional and fatigue effects (see Hardwick & Edwards, 2012; Roberts, Hayes et al., 2015) .
A scrambled-sentence task was used to prime a social attitude and consisted of an A4
four-page booklet with six partially formed sentences on each page. Self-monitoring was measured using the 18-item self-monitoring scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) . Participants responded to each item with true ('T') or false ('F'). Before calculating the sum of the scores for each participant, ten items were reverse-scored, with high scores indicating high selfmonitoring, and low scores indicating low-self-monitoring. The groups were differentiated by a median split of the self-monitoring scores (e.g., Cheng & Chartrand, 2003) .
Stimuli
The visual stimuli consisted of a human model that moved the right arm cyclically across the mid-line of the body with a horizontal, or curvilinear, trajectory for 30 s. The model stimuli were scaled so participants approximated a 400 mm horizontal displacement for each individual movement segment (i.e., left-to-right, right-to-left). While the horizontal stimuli followed a relatively straight horizontal movement trajectory, the curvilinear stimuli featured predominant horizontal amplitude with an added vertical component, which peaked at around the midsagittal axis. Thus, the curvilinear movement end-points aligned with those of the horizontal stimuli, but the movement trajectory was different (see Roberts, Hayes et al., 2015; Sparks, Douglas, & Kritikos, 2016) . There were two model stimuli for each of the horizontal and curvilinear trajectories. The movements were well practised by the models so that the required movement amplitude and segment frequency of 1 Hz was accurate and consistent. Finally, the control condition consisted of a static display of the human model with a red fixation dot positioned at screen centre. The control condition was designed to ensure there was no attention or muscular fatigue effects from performing continuous horizontal arm movements across trials.
Task and Procedure
Upon entering the lab, participants performed two tasks: a scrambled-sentence task and motor task. For the scrambled-sentence task, participants were instructed that the task was designed to assess how colour influences language proficiency (Leighton et al., 2010) . In this task, participants had to carefully combine a selection of five different coloured words with already selected words to form a comprehensive sentence (adapted from Wang & Hamilton, 2013) (see Figure 2) . When accurately formed, the sentences reflected pro-social (e.g., 'help') or anti-social (e.g., 'fight') behaviours in a first-(e.g., 'I') or third-person (i.e.,
'Chris') perspective. To check the sentences were accurate, and to ensure participants acknowledged the prime-constructs, they read the sentence aloud. The motor task involved participants executing cyclical horizontal arm movements across the mid-line of the body.
Prior to the test phase, participants practised (x 2 trials) performing the required arm movements by executing horizontal movements between two static targets positioned on the left and right side of the screen and in-time with a 1 Hz auditory metronome (i.e., one arm movement segment per auditory tone; 2 Hz movement cycles). The target dots and auditory metronome were then removed prior to the test phase. Participants would execute the same arm movements whilst fixating on a stationary dot (control), or in-time with a horizontal or curvilinear movement stimulus (experimental conditions).
During the experimental conditions, participants completed one sentence on the scrambled-sentence task before executing a trial of the motor task. There were six trials for each of the movement stimuli per block, with each block primed by a pro-social or anti-social context from the first-person or third-person perspective. The block order was counter-balanced across participants. Within each block of trials, the model stimuli were pseudorandomly presented with the caveat that no stimulus could be presented on more than two consecutive trials. For a single participant, the pro-social prime-construct was assigned to one model and the anti-social was assigned to the other (e.g., pro-social for 'Model A', anti-social for 'Model B'). The assignment of model stimuli to prime-constructs was counter-balanced across participants. Finally, the control trials were presented at the start and end of the trial order in order to assess the potential of attention and muscular fatigue effects. Following the observation-execution task, participants completed the 18-item self-monitoring questionnaire (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) . The delivery of the questionnaire toward the end of the experiment ensured participants did not raise any suspicions surrounding the overall purposes of the experiment, nor bias their response during the motor task.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Data reduction and analysis
Arm position data were low-pass filtered at 10 Hz using an autoregressive filter implemented in MATLAB. Individual movement segments were determined by identifying the reversal points of the primary movement axis (i.e., x-axis; horizontal). Standard deviation of the fingertip position within the orthogonal movement axis was extracted (i.e., y-axis; vertical) for each movement segment. Average deviation was calculated across movement segments of individual trials.
For the statistical analysis, we first performed a comparison (using Mann-Whitney U test due to unequal variance of the groups) between the ratings of self-monitoring in the high and low groups to ensure proper distinction for the category of self-monitoring (i.e., high > low). We then conducted a 2 self-monitoring (high self-monitors, low self-monitors) x 2 trial number (start, end) mixed-design ANOVA on average deviation data of control trials in order to determine any attention and muscular fatigue effects. For experimental trial data, we conducted a 2 self-monitoring (high self-monitors, low self-monitors) x 2 stimuli (horizontal, curvilinear) x 2 prime (pro-social, anti-social) x 2 perspective (first-person, third-person) mixed-design ANOVA on average deviation with self-monitoring being the only betweenmeasures factor. Significant effects featuring more than two means were decomposed using Tukey HSD post hoc procedure, and significant effects were declared at p < .05.
Results
The experimental control checks indicated that while participants were able to acknowledge the social component of the first-and third-person sentences, they were unable to infer any influence toward the interpersonal observation-execution task. They also believed that the instructions issued by the experimenter in the scrambled-sentence task were a test of language proficiency, and the interpersonal observation-execution task was a measure of motor control (Wang & Hamilton, 2013) . The comparison between self-monitoring scores for the high and low groups indicated an appropriate characteristic split of the data (Ws = 171.00, z = -5.22, p < .05), with the high group (mdn = 11) reporting a significantly greater selfmonitoring score than the low group (mdn = 6).
Movement deviation
The comparison of control trials revealed no significant main effect of self-monitoring Figure 3 , there was less deviation for the incongruent stimulus when primed by the pro-social compared to the anti-social cues in the high self-monitoring group, but not the low self-monitoring group. There were no significant differences for the congruent stimulus across pro-social and anti-social cues in each of the self-monitoring groups. Finally, there was no significant main effect, nor an interaction featuring the factor of perspective (ps > .05).
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Discussion
Extending upon previous work that showed mimicry is modulated by social primes (Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton et al., 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 2013) , the present study additionally examined the influence of self-monitoring during an interpersonal observationexecution task (Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016) . Participants were primed by a pro-social or anti-social cue, presented in the first-or third-person perspective, prior to executing cyclical horizontal arm movements during the observation of congruent horizontal or incongruent curvilinear arm movements. In addition, participants were categorized as high or low in selfmonitoring. Results showed greater involuntary movement deviation when observing the 13 incongruent stimulus following an anti-social prime compared to a pro-social prime, and that these effects were primarily found in the high compared to low self-monitors.
The social modulation effect shown in the current study is inconsistent with evidence showing greater mimicry following a pro-social compared to the anti-social prime (e.g., Cook & Bird, 2012; Leighton et al., 2010) . However, they are in accord with the predictions of the STORM model (Wang & Hamilton, 2012) , which suggests modulation effects courtesy of social primes are underpinned by the observer's interpretation of the social context. For example, anti-social primes can cause greater mimicry than pro-social primes in situations where the observer initially seeks affiliation (Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016) . Thus, in a situation of perceiving an anti-social prime, an observer may increase their mimicry because it typically elicits positive social affect in the observed agent, while compensating for any initial deterioration in the social exchange (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Over & Carpenter, 2009 ). On the other hand, pro-social primes may produce greater mimicry than anti-social primes during situations of limited social context because the primes can begin to initiate a strategic incentive to affiliate. Taken together, the overriding incentive to accumulate affiliation, along with the subsequent use of mimicry in order to achieve this incentive, may represent the most common feature of all the empirical cases (e.g., Leighton et al., 2010; Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016) that lend support to the STORM account.
The above interpretation is supported by the fact that only high self-monitors demonstrated social modulation. High self-monitors are defined by their increased sensitivity and/or ability to detect and use situational cues to modulate subsequent behaviour.
Consequently, high self-monitors may be described as persons of impression. Thus, the social primes presented in the current study seemed to be more readily accessible to high selfmonitors who used this information to modulate mimicry in order to convey a certain impression of themselves. In the context of the STORM model, it may be that the increased 14 motor contagion following an anti-social compared to pro-social prime in high self-monitors, and not low self-monitors, resulted from an initial interpretation of an anti-social context, which renders a potential threat to achieving affiliation. As a result, high self-monitors showed greater mimicry because it is typically a process that can advance social outcomes (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) , while potentially overcoming any perceived disadvantages toward reaching social goals. This conjecture is consistent with evidence that shows high self-monitors mimic those they have a greater desire to affiliate with (e.g., fellow students) (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003) , and when the action to-be-mimicked pertains to a positive social affect (e.g., laughing) (Estow et al., 2007) .
Of interest, the greater social modulation effect in high self-monitors was underpinned by a down-regulation of motor contagion (inhibition) following a pro-social prime rather than an up-regulation (facilitation) following an anti-social prime. The direction of this effect is consistent with high self-monitors mimicking less than low self-monitors when primed to a position of power (i.e., leader), where there may be a reduced social incentive (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003) . Moreover, high self-monitors decrease mimicry after they have experienced a successful interaction with the incentive to affiliate compared to having no incentive to affiliate (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003) . Therefore, high self-monitors are just as likely to reduce mimicry in order to respond to situations where they do not need to generate pro-social behaviour, as well as situations where mimicry may be more strongly needed to achieve social gains. Alternatively, low self-monitors seem to mimic observed actions regardless of the situation or context. Therefore, why did high self-monitors find themselves inhibiting motor contagion following pro-social primes?
To address this, we consider the influence that mimicry has on the observed agent (person being mimicked) during interpersonal settings. Generally speaking, being mimicked increases the sense of liking and/or affiliation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999 , see Chartrand & Lakin, 2013 . However, mimicry is modulated by the specific context in which it unfolds.
That is, mimicry beholds particular standards or expectancies surrounding the magnitude and frequency of its occurrence. For example, mimicry elicits colder feelings (i.e., the "chills";
indicator of negative social affect) when initially greeted with a formal affiliative demeanour compared to an informal non-affiliative demeanour (Experiment 1; Leander, Chartrand, & Bargh, 2012) . In addition, mimicry causes colder feelings in independent individuals that are predisposed to greater social anxiety and avoidance, compared to interdependent individuals (Experiment 3; Leander et al., 2012) . Thus, it appears that when the implicit standards of mimicry are contrasted (e.g., too much/too little mimicry), an adverse social affect manifests within the observer. In the context of the present study, the instruction to move in synchrony with the observed model may have generated an initial incentive to affiliate with the model.
As a result, the pro-social prime may have heightened the social engagement, and therefore contrasted with the observer's implicit standards. That is, the observer may be cautious not to violate the expectations surrounding an unfamiliar interpersonal exchange, where too much mimicry may be misconstrued as suspicious (Leander et al., 2012) . Presumably, high selfmonitors would have prevented this from happening by attempting to decrease the amount of contagion (or mimicry). Notably, this pattern of modulation is consistent with the STORM account, which suggests the control of mimicry is contingent upon the perceived social context and individual incentive to affiliate. Therefore, high self-monitors may have been more sensitive to the perceived social context (e.g., social prime word), and thus able to modulate their motor contagion so not to diminish the social gains by producing too much (pro-social context) or too little (anti-social context) mimicry.
The alternative Active-Self account suggests that social modulation is related to how the perceived social primes either assimilate or contrast with the active-self-concept (Wang & Hamilton, 2013) . Based on this particular account, it was predicted that the prime to person-perspective (1 st , 3 rd ) should influence the direction of social modulation with pro-social primes generating greater contagion than anti-social primes when taken from the first-person perspective (assimilation), and anti-social primes generating greater mimicry than pro-social primes when taken from the third-person perspective (contrast). However, the current findings indicate that there was no influence of person-perspective suggesting social modulation in our task occurs independent of the perspective in which the social prime was presented. In reconciling the reported effects of person-perspective for the current and previous studies (i.e., Wang & Hamilton, 2013) , it is important to consider the differences between each of the experimental tasks adopted. Indeed, the current study required observers to synchronize their movements with another human agent, which may activate a prior social incentive (Miles et al., 2010) . Alternatively, Wang and Hamilton required observers to generate a motor response following the presentation of a manual gesture (i.e., stimulusresponse paradigm) (see Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016 for further discussion).
Further evidence that conflicts with the Active-Self account include the lack of modulation shown by low self-monitors. Indeed, low self-monitors are typically concerned with dispositional cues and tend to prime behaviour through the active-self-concept. Thus, they may be described as individuals of expression. If the active-self-concept underlies social modulation then it was expected that greater modulation would occur for low self-monitors.
This thinking was based on findings of low self-monitors being more likely to guide their primed response behaviour (e.g., select 'lucky' words) according to the observed primeconstruct (e.g., observe a prime mask of '7', which is associated with being lucky) (DeMarree et al., 2005 ; see also Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2008) . However, it appears that the priming effects reported previously in low self-monitors may be different to those pertaining to the mimicry of human actions. In the context of the present study, the low self-monitors were perhaps less sensitive toward the influence of social context, which led to reduced social modulation.
In summary, we found greater motor contagion in high self-monitors following the presentation of an anti-social prime compared to a pro-social prime. Moreover, high selfmonitors appeared to inhibit contagion following a pro-social prime. Therefore, high selfmonitors most likely modulated motor contagion through increased sensitivity toward the social context, which suggests social modulation is a result of a primed social incentive within the observer (STORM account; Wang & Hamilton, 2012) . As a result, social modulation appears to be underpinned by the impression one tries to form given the social context, and not the expression of internal states. Indeed, it appears top-down social processes are highly attuned to the precise affects mimicry will have on the observed confederate and subsequent social exchange. Further research is required in order to more precisely examine this proposal. Finally, it is of interest to examine whether these suggestions extend to the observation and copying of non-biological entities such as robots. Following the recent findings of increased neural activity (Chaminade et al., 2010; Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007) and visuomotor priming (Press et al., 2006) during the observation of actions and emotions of robots, it is possible that human observers could still prime social incentives for the modulation of the copying of non-biological entities. Error bars represent between-subject standard errors.
Footnotes
1. We do not suggest self-monitoring is solely categorised by a nominal distribution of select individuals, but instead operates on a continuous scale rendering some individuals with more/less self-monitoring tendencies (Snyder, 1974; Synder & Gangestad, 1986) .
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